The maximal number of totally mixed Nash equilibria in games of several players equals the number of block derangements, as proved by McKelvey and McLennan. On the other hand, counting the derangements is a well studied problem. The numbers are identified as linearization coefficients for Laguerre polynomials. MacMahon derived a generating function for them as an application of his master theorem. This article relates the algebraic, combinatorial and game-theoretic problems that were not connected before. New recurrence relations, hypergeometric formulas and asymptotics for the derangement counts are derived. An upper bound for the total number of all Nash equilibria is given.
Game-theoretic introduction
Game theory offers mathematical modeling of strategic decision making. A central concept is that of Nash equilibrium: it is a combination of strategies of participating players such that no player can improve his payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy. The strategies can be pure (when a player chooses a single available option) or mixed (when a player makes a choice randomly, by assigning probabilities to his options). Totally mixed strategies play any available strategy with a non-zero probability. A totally mixed Nash equilibrium (or TMNE for shorthand) is a Nash equilibrium where everyone plays a totally mixed strategy.
As we recall in §2, finding TMNE leads to a system of polynomial equations for the probabilities. The polynomial system has finitely many solutions (in C) in general, hence games with generic payoffs have finitely many TMNE. An interesting question is: 
elements into S sets with m j − 1 elements each (j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , S}). The count can be eloquently formulated as follows:
Consider a card recreation of S players, each with n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n S cards originally. All cards are shuffled together, and then each player j receives the same number n j of cards as originally. Let E(n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n S ) denote the number of ways to deal the cards in such a way that no player receives a card that he held originally.
The maximal number of TMNE in a generic (i.e., regular [8] ) game with m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m S pure options equals
If n 1 = . . . = n S = 1, these partitions (or permutations) are known as derangements. The permutations of n 1 + . . . + n S elements that give their partitions into S subsets as restricted in the card recreation are well-studied [4] , [1] , [5] as generalized derangements (or by a similar term). The count of the permutations or partitions differs by the factor n 1 ! · · · n S !. Let us refer to the restricted partitions as block derangements. MacMahon [7, §III, Ch. III] gave a generating function for the number of block derangements, as one of the first applications of his master theorem. Let σ j denote the j-th elementary symmetric polynomial in the variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x S :
MacMahon proved that E(n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n S ) equals the coefficient to x
in the multivariate Taylor expansion of the rational function
at (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x S ) = (0, 0, . . . , 0). The generating function for the maximal number of TMNE is adjusted by the argument shift in (2). The adjustment is by the factor σ S , thus the maximal number of TMNE (in a generic game of S players with respectively m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m S pure options) equals the coefficient to x
in the multivariate Taylor expansion of
at (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x S ) = (0, 0, . . . , 0).
Moreover, the numbers E(n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n S ) are identified [4] as linearization coefficients for the Laguerre polynomials [21] :
The Laguerre polynomials form an orthonormal basis in the Hilbert space L 2 ([0, ∞); w(z)), with respect to the weight function w(z) = exp(−z). Therefore
The linearization problem [1] , [5] is interested in expressing products of Laguerre polynomials in the basis of Laguerre polynomials:
The linearization coefficients C (k) n1,n2,...,nT are naturally computed as
Remarkably [4] ,
where ε = (−1) k+n1+n2+...+nT . Zeilberger [22] tells the interesting story of Gillis investigating the derangement count in 1928, deriving the same recurrences for the linearization coefficients in 1960, and noticing the coincidence in 1976. Quite similarly, this article relates the results in [8] to MacMahon's master theorem and known results on block derangements.
The Nash equilibria, the multihomogeneous Bézout bound for their algebraic system and MacMahon's master theorem are related in §2. The supplementing article [3] generalizes the application of MacMahon's master theorem to more general algebraic systems, and discusses computational complexity. Section 3 here summarizes easy special cases of counting block derangements. Truly new results are presented in §4-6: compact recurrence relations and asymptotics for E(n 1 , . . . , n S ) and an upper bound for the total number of all Nash equilibria.
Applying MacMahon's master theorem
Let Ω = {1, 2, . . . , S} denote the set of players, and let Θ j = {1, 2, . . . , m j } denote the set of options of the player j ∈ Ω. For any combination (k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k S ) of available options with k i ∈ Θ i each player j ∈ Ω receives a defined payoff a (j) k1,k2,...,kS . The totally mixed strategies in a TMNE are then such that each player j receives the same payoff P j with any strategy (as long as others' strategies do not change). For j ∈ Ω, k ∈ Θ j , let p (j) k denote the probability that the jth player chooses the kth option in his strategy. The non-zero probabilities must satisfy the algebraic equations:
· · ·
This is a system of m 1 + . . . + m S + S equations in exactly so many variables (counting P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P S as well). If the payoffs a
k1,k2,...,kS are generic, the number of solutions is finite. When the strategies are not totally mixed, there are inequality conditions as we remind in §5.
We keep the notation n j = m j − 1 for j ∈ Ω. As in [8] , we simplify the algebraic system (8)-(11) by eliminating P 1 , . . . , P S in each block (8)- (10), and ignoring the equations (11) . This gives us a system of N = m 1 +. . .+m S −S equations in m 1 + . . . + m S variables, but the equations are multihomogeneous and multilinear in the S blocks p
mj (j ∈ Ω) of variables. The multihomogeneous system on P n1 × · · · × P nS has finitely many complex solutions generically, since the product of projective spaces has the total dimension N = n 1 +. . .+n S , Each TMNE gives a solution of the multihomogeneous system. Conversely: a multihomogeneous solution is normalized to a TMNE by the equations (11) if it is defined over R and representative values p The number of TMNE in generic games is bounded by the BKK (BernsteinKhovansky-Koushnirenko [2] ) bound of the algebraic system. The TMNE system (8)- (10) is multihomogenous, hence the more specific multihomogenous Bézout bound applies. From a geometric perspective, we have a full intersection on P n1 × · · · × P nS generically. The theorem below is formulated for dehomogenized variables.
Theorem 2.1 (Multihomogeneous Bézout bound). Consider a system of N equations in N affine variables, partitioned into S subsets so that the j-th subset includes n j affine variables, and N = n 1 + · · · + n S . Let d ij be the degree of the i-th equation in the j-th variable subset, for i = 1, . . . , N and j = 1, . . . , S.
Then the coefficient of
bounds the number complex roots of the system. For generic coefficients this bound is tight.
Proof. See [9] , for example.
The Bézout multihomogenous bound for the system (8)-(10) equals the coefficient to
Proof. Let P j (i) denote the expression of P j in (8)- (10) with the specified i.
The equations
contribute the factor (X − x j ) nj in (12), as they do not contain variables of the jth block, and are linear in the variables of each other block.
The corollary begs application of MacMahon's master theorem [7] . This theorem has most powerful applications to counting restricted partitions and proving binomial identities.
Theorem 2.3 (MacMahon, 1916). Consider a complex matrix
Let x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x S be formal variables, and let V denote the diagonal matrix with the non-zero entries
around (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x S ) = (0, 0, . . . , 0).
For the context of the TMNE system (8)- (10), the matrix A is determined by Corollary 2.2:
Let M denote the matrix (Id − V A). We have
The function in (16) is then the generating function for the numbers E(n 1 , . . . , n S ).
To prove the generating function (4), we just have to compute the determinant.
Proof. The determinant is a symmetric function of x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x S , at most linear in each variable. Hence it is a linear combination of σ 0 = 1 and σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ S . The linear combination can be recovered from the diagonal specialization
If we set all variables equal to 1/λ,
Here det(λ − A) is the characteristic polynomial of A. The rank of (Id + A) equals 1, hence λ = −1 is an eigenvalue of A with the multiplicity S − 1.
Other eigenvalue is λ = S − 1, with an eigenvector consisting of all 1's. Hence det(λ − A) = (λ + 1) S−1 (λ − S + 1) and
The product in (13) can be related to the card recreation as follows. We write it as a product of N terms
Let the first term represent the players to which the first card of the first player could be dealt, and so on. Expansion of the product gives the generating function for the number of ways the cards could be dealt (in variable quantities to the players) so that no player receives a card of his own. The coefficient to x n1 1 · · · x nS S gives the McKelvey-McLennan count. In [8] , the combinatorial count was derived using the more general BKK bound. As detailed in [3] , the BKK bound is defined in terms of mixed volumes, and is related to the multihomogeneous Bézout bound via matrix permanents [21] . The supplementing article [3] explores application of MacMahon's master theorem to BKK bounds of more general algebraic systems.
Generally, not all complex solutions of (8)- (10) give proper real solutions defining TMNE. But [8, §4] gives families of games where the number of TMNE achieves the BKK bound. In [6] , the systems whose all roots represent TMNE are parametrized.
Special cases
Here we summarize known explicit results about the numbers E(n 1 , . . . , n S ) counting block derangements, and give a complete set of hypergeometric formulas for the case S = 3.
For S = 2 players,
. This is consistent with the orthogonality of Laguerre polynomials, and with the fact that there is at most one TMNE in generic games of two players each with m 1 = m 2 choices, while there are generically no TMNE if m 1 = m 2 . The system (8)- (11) is linear when S = 2, and has an over-determined subsystem if additionally m 1 = m 2 .
Similarly, E(n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n S ) = 0 for n 1 > n 2 +. . .+n S both by the McKelveyMcLennan count and in the generating function (as the denominator has no linear terms). In the context of Laguerre polynomials, this reflects orthogonality of
we count dealings of n 1 cards of the first player to the others: [8] gives some numbers E(n, n, . . . , n). A few columns and rows of this table appear in Sloan's encyclopedia of integer sequences [16] . In particular,
• E(1, 1, . . . , 1) equals the number of derangements of S elements (OEIS sequence A000166), i.e., the number of permutations without fixed elements.
We have
This is the maximal number of TMNE for S players when each has 2 options.
• E(2, 2, . . . , 2), E(3, 3, . . . , 3), E(4, 4, . . . , 4), E(5, 5, . . . , 5) are the cardmatching numbers (or dinner-dinner matching numbers) defined by following the McKelvey-McLennan description. These are the OEIS sequences A000459 (alias A059072), A059073, A059074 and A123297.
• E(n, n, n) are the Franel numbers (OEIS sequence A000172):
In the context of Laguerre polynomials, this was noticed by Askey; see end comment (b) in [4] .
The linearization problem for orthogonal polynomials is substantially solved when products of two polynomials are linearized. Hence the numbers E(n 1 , n 2 , n 3 ) are of foremost interest. For S = 4, a linearization reduction leads to
as asserted in [4, (28) ]. More generally,
For computational purposes, the integral representation (6)- (7) gives an effective, polynomial time algorithm to get the E-numbers. Hypergeometric 3 F 2 (±1) expressions for E(n 1 , n 2 , n 3 ) are known [4] . Recall the definition of hypergeometric series:
where (α) n = α(α + 1)(α + 2) · · · (α + n − 1) is the rising factorial. The hypergeometric series terminates if (at least) one of the parameters α, β, γ is zero or a negative integer. It is not well defined if ζ or η is zero or a negative integer, unless some of α, β, γ are such integers closer to 0. For cleaner formulas, we change the notation from (n 1 , n 2 , n 3 ) to (a, b, c), and set
For nonzero E(a, b, c), the triangle inequalities a b + c, b a + c, c a + b must be satisfied. This is equivalent to r max(a, b, c).
Proof. These are the formulas (35)-(37) in [4] . Note that the first formula directly specializes to the Franel numbers (21) . The second formula is the same sum in a hypergeometric form. Formulas (27) and (28) are related by Whipple's quadratic transformation [20, §7] :
To prove the theorem independently from [4] , it is thus enough to show (28). We use the generating function:
Shifting the inner summation index n by c = max(a, b, c) gives (28).
More 3 F 2 (1) expressions for E(a, b, c) are obtained by using Whipple's group of transformations for 3 F 2 (1) series [19] . Whipple defined an orbit 120 allied closely related general 3 F 2 (1) series, analogous to the 24 Kummer's 2 F 1 (z) functions. When terminating [13] or ill-defined 3 F 2 (1) sums are involved, Whipple's relations between the 120 allied functions degenerate. Starting from (28), we obtain both ill-defined and terminating (of various length) 3 F 2 (1) sums.
The most interesting new expressions for E(a, b, c) are summarized in the following theorem. The terminating sums have a, b, c, r − a, r − b or r − c terms. In particular, formula (34) has min(p − b, p − c) terms for even a + b + c, while a terms for odd a + b + c. The similar formula (37) has p − c terms for even a+ b + c, but is undefined for odd a+ b + c. Other terminating 3 F 2 (1) expressions are obtained by rewriting the presented sums in the reverse order. For example, formula (28) is rewritten as follows, for even and odd a + b + c respectively:
Theorem 3.2. The following terminating 3 F 2 (1) expressions hold:
For even a + b + c:
For odd a + b + c:
Proof. Whipple's symmetries [19] 
is invariant under the permutations of r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 , r 5 , generally. The same S 5 -symmetry generally holds for other F ±i jk . The six r j 's are identified as
Particularly,
etc. Formulas (31)-(39) are identified and proved by checking that the symmetries (40) hold (in continuous limit) between well-defined terminating F ±i jk with any fixed upper parameter ±i, and relating the functions with different ±i by reversal of terminating hypergeometric sums.
The whole picture of the allied 3 F 2 (1) sums with a non-negative upper parameter is given in the table below. For a concrete identification, we assume a b c. Some of formulas (31) E(a, b, c) . The other 3 F 2 (1) series are ill-defined or divergent, including the non-terminating cases of (36)-(39).
Formulas (31)-(33) and (28) specialize to the following expressions for the Franel numbers, respectively:
The expression in (42) was proved by Strehl [17, (29) ], while expressions (43), (44) were proved by Sun [16] , [18] .
Recurrence relations
In [4] , recurrence relations for the numbers E(n 1 , . . . , n S ) are derived from the three-term recurrence for Laguerre polynomials. Formulas (31), (32) in [4] tell:
The argument c can be replaced by any sequence of arguments. Formula (34) in [4] is a 4-term linear recurrence for E(a, b, c), but the 3 F 2 (1) expressions imply that any 3 values of E(a, b, c) are related by a linear relation. The next theorem spells out basic 3-term relations for E(a, b, c).
Generally, compact recurrences can be obtained and proved by considering partial differential equations for the generating function F M (x 1 , . . . , x n ). Let us introduce the differential operators
Partial differential equations are represented by differential operators in the Weyl algebra C x 1 , . . . , x S ; D 1 , . . . , D S , with the nontrivial commutation relations D j x j = x j D j + x j . Recurrences are represented by (negative) shift operators in the algebra C n 1 , . . . , n S ; T 1 , . . . , T S , with the nontrivial commutation relations T j n j = (n j − 1)T j . The correspondence between the differential and shift operators is realized by the algebra isomorphism
To get recurrences with fewer terms, we look for differential operators (of any order) with few distinct C[x 1 , . . . , x S ] monomials in the coefficients to products of D j 's.
Theorem 4.1. The following recurrences hold:
2a
Proof. The first two recurrences follow from the differential operators
annihilating F M (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ). The other two recurrences are linear combinations of (48)-(49).
For any S 3, the following two recurrences follow from linear differential operators for F M (x 1 , . . . , x n ). To present the results compactly, we indicate only the shifted parameters of E = E(n 1 , . . . , n S ). The first formula is a generalization of the 5-term relation in (47). 
Proof. Let us denote:
and subsequently
Elimination of H gives the following differential operators that annihilate G:
To get differential operators annihilating F M , multiply each
This leads to the claimed recurrences.
The last recurrences have 5 and S + 1 terms, respectively. But the order of recurrences appears to grow quadratically with S. For example, for S = 4 the recurrence with shifts in a alone has order 6 (thus 7 terms), with the coefficients are of degree 9 in a, b, c, d. Here is a 6-term relation:
A few more 6-term relations are obtained by combination with (52).
Bounding the number of all Nash equilibria
As in §2, consider a generic game of S players with m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m S options. In a subgame we allow each player j ∈ Ω to choose from a fixed non-empty subset of his original pure options Θ j , and keep the payoffs a (j k1,k2,...,kS the same for the still possible combinations of pure options. Any Nash equilibrium of the original game can be considered as a TMNE of the subgame that allows only the options played with a non-zero probability. On the other hand, not all TMNE of a subgame would be Nash equilibria for the original game. In the notation of the proof of Corollary 2.2, we must have the inequalities P j (i) P j (k) for any j, i, k with p
To bound the number of all Nash equilibria (in a generic game), we add up the maximal E-numbers of TMNE for all of its subgames. Let us denote this sum by B (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m S ) . In the case of two players, E(i, k) = δ i,k , hence we are counting then the number of pairs of non-empty subsets of Θ 1 , Θ 2 of the same size k:
The binomial sum (from k = 0) is evaluated as a special case of the ChuVandermonde formula [21] . The bound B(m, m) ∈ Θ 4 m / √ m is well known. In [14] , a sharper upper bound in Θ (3 √ 3/2) m / √ m for the total number of Nash equilibria is noted, and games of two players with Θ (
Generally, our bound is
First we prove an easier similar sum.
Proof. We adopt the context of the card recreation described in the introduction. The left-hand side counts block derangements in all subsets of N = n 1 + . . .+ n S cards, while the right-hand side counts all partitions of the N cards to sets of n 1 , . . . , n S cards. There is a bijection between the block derangements and the partitions, where each partition (of the whole set of N cards) is considered as a block derangement (of a subset) after ignoring the cards that are dealt back to the same player. We count E(0, . . . , 0) = 1.
We characterize the bound B(m 1 , . . . , m S ) as a sum of multinomial coefficients. That leads to the generating function for these numbers. 
Proof. We set m j = n j + 1 and shift the summation indices in (55):
Iterated use of
The binomial coefficients with ℓ j < k j are zero. After expanding the binomial coefficients in (56), we sum up by the k j 's first using Lemma 5.1. in the multivariate Taylor expansion of 
Here B is the multivariate version of the Borel transform [21] that sends x 
Asymptotics
Asymptotics of coefficients of multivariate functions can be computed using the machinery developed in [10] , [11] , [12] . We compute the asymptotics for E(n, . . . , n), E(a, b, c) and B(n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n S ). Proof. Let H denote the denominator of F M in (4). In the context of [10, §3] or [12, §3] , the set of contributing points is determined by x i ∂H/∂x i = x j ∂H/∂x j for i = j, and H = 0. Since all coordinates x i must be positive, we have x i = x j .
From (18) we determine x i = 1/(S − 1). We have thus one smooth contributing point Q. For the Hessian matrix, we evaluate simple binomial sums:
In [12, Proposition 3.4] , the off-diagonal entries equal a = 1 − 2/S. The result follows.
In particular, E(n, n, n) ∼ 2 3n+1 / √ 3πn is the asymptotics for Franel numbers as attributed to Keane in [16] . This also follows from the next result. as all a, b, c approach infinity in a proportional manner.
